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The purpose of this study is to elucidate under which circumstances, how, and to what 
extent market power on the TGC market can be used to affect the entire electricity 
market. There are basically two reasons for being concerned with market power in 
TGC markets. One is that a small number of companies may have exclusive access to 
first rate sites for wind power generation. The other is that withdrawal of a small 
number of TGCs implies a multiple reduction of electricity consumption, with corre-
sponding increases of end user prices. For the purpose of investigating the principles 
by which market power may be exercised in this setting a simple analytical model is 
designed and analytical results are derived. To investigate matters further a numerical 
model, based on the analytical model, is constructed for the Nordic countries. Among 
the Nordic countries only Sweden has a TGC market but there is a common Nordic 
electricity market with free trade of electricity. The analysis shows that Swedish com-
panies possessing capacity for green electricity generation, indeed, have the ability to 
exercise market power on the common Nordic power market by withholding TGCs. 
However, the analysis reveals that an opening of TGC trade between the the Nordic 
countries to a large extent achieves the objective of eliminating the use of market 
power that would otherwise be established. Also, this may have a cushioning effect on 
the volatility of TGC prices.   
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In Sweden a market for Tradable Green Certificates (TGCs) was introduced in 2003. 
The purpose was to stimulate investments in electricity generation based on renew-
able energy sources without using direct governmental subsidies to renewable energy. 
More precisely the aim is to create a market where different types of renewable elec-
tricity can compete on equal terms, thus relieving governments and public agencies 
from being directly involved in power industry investment decisions.  
 
Like any other market a TGC market consists of sellers and buyers. The sellers are the 
generators of “green” electricity
4. The generators obtain an amount of TGCs corre-
sponding to the amount of green electricity they feed into the network i.e. one MWh 
of green electricity generated gives rise to one TGC. The sellers thus get revenues 
both from selling the electricity on the electricity wholesale market and from immedi-
ately selling the TGCs received from the issuing body on the TGC market. However, 
they may also decide to sell the certificates at a later date, or even not at all. 
 
The buyers of TGCs are the consumers and retailing companies that are required to 
acquire certificates corresponding to a certain percentage of the total consumption of 
electricity (“the percentage requirement”). In other words the demand for TGCs is 
directly derived from the demand for electricity. A market clearing price of TGCs is 
determined by the interplay of supply and demand.  
 
An important aspect of a TGC system is that the percentage requirement creates a di-
rect link between the electricity market and the TGC market. What happens in the 
electricity market has a direct impact on the TGC market and vice versa. Moreover, as 
the demand for electricity tends to be inelastic, the derived demand for TGCs is even 
more inelastic. Several studies have focused on various implications of the direct link 
between the two markets
5. 
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4 By “green” electricity is meant electricity produced by means of wind-, sun-, wave- and geothermal 
energy as well as by biomass and peat and (new) small hydropower plants. 
5 Amundsen and Mortensen (2001), as well as Amundsen and Nese (2004) show that an increase of the 
percentage requirement does not necessarily lead to an increase of the generation of green electricity 
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It seems to us that many of the problems discussed in these studies were not well un-
derstood when TGC markets were designed and introduced. Another issue that also 
seems to have been overlooked is the risk for and impact of market power in the TGC 
market. 
 
The purpose of this study is to elucidate under which circumstances, how, and to what 
extent market power in the TGC market can be used to affect the entire electricity 
market. There are basically two reasons for being concerned with market power in 
TGC markets.  
 
The first is the fact that the industry average cost curve for green electricity tends to 
be upward sloping. This is because the cost of wind power, one important source of 
green electricity, depends on the wind conditions at the site of the plant, and that dif-
ferent sites differ significantly in this respect. The situation is similar for environmen-
tally friendly hydro power, and, to some extent, for other types of green electricity. In 
the short and medium term the location of suitable sites in relation to the existing 
power grid implies that investments in green electricity generation, to a varying ex-
tent, should include investments in transmission capacity connecting the power plant 
to the existing grid. In the case of biomass and peat other kinds of transportation in-
frastructure investments may be needed.  
 
Thus, given the state of technology and the upward sloping cost curve, there is a limit 
on the amount of green electricity that can be produced within a country. This means 
that some generators, by getting access to the suitable sites, will become dominating 
producers of green electricity and thus may be able to exercise market power in the 
TGC market. Currently the number of “green electricity” producers in Sweden is very 
large, but 96 percent of them produce less than 50 GWh per annum (18 percent of the 
total production of green electricity). On the other hand the three major power com-
                                                                                                                                            
and that harsher CO2 constraints (tax or permits) will definitely lead to less green electricity with this 
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system). Amundsen, Baldursson and Mortensen (2004) analysed the volatility of TGC price stemming 
from the annual variations of wind power. Several specific features of  multi-country TGC markets 
have been studied by Finon and Menanteau (2003), Bergman and Radetzki (2003),  Nese (2003) and 
Unger and Ahlgren (2003), Butler and Neuhoff (2004), Amundsen and Nese (2009),  
 
  3panies produce around 25 percent of all green electricity, and on the basis of current 
investment plans this share is likely to increase significantly in the near future. 
 
The second reason for being concerned with market power in a TGC market is that, as 
a result of the percentage requirement, the withdrawal of a given number of TGCs 
from the market forces a much larger reduction of electricity consumption (e.g. if the 
percentage requirement is 10 the withdrawal of one certificate will induce a reduction 
of 10 MWh of consumption). Thus, relatively modest exercise of market power in the 
TGC market may have a significant impact on the price of electricity and the alloca-
tion of resources in the power industry. Moreover, by having access to a large share of 
the best sites for generation of green electricity a “small” power producer may be able 
to exercise market power in the electricity market by exercising market power in the 
TGC market. 
 
In order to elucidate the interplay between the electricity and TGC markets a simple 
analytical model is presented. Then a numerical version of the model, depicting the 
Nordic electricity market and the Norwegian-Swedish market for TGCs is used to 
quantify the impact of TGC market power under various assumptions about the distri-
bution of the essential resources for green electricity production. 
 
2. An analytical model  
The following model is designed to capture the interplay between the electricity and 
TGC markets. The following variables will be applied 
 
p : End-use price of electricity 
s : TGC price  
q: Wholesale price of electricity 
x: Quantity of total electricity 
y : Quantity of “black” electricity 
z : Quantity of ”green” electricity 
: w  Number of TGCs sold 
: v  Number of TGCs used 
α : Percentage requirement 
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The inverse demand function for electricity is assumed given by 








The cost function for black electricity for a given producer, i(i= 1,…,n) is assumed 
given by  
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The cost function for green electricity is assumed given by  
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Both black and green electricity are delivered to a common wholesale market, from 
where profit maximizing retailing companies purchase electricity for end-use deliver-
ies. In addition to the wholesale market there is also a market for TGCs.  
 
We consider two cases with respect to the functioning of the electricity and TGC 
markets. In the first we assume that the electricity market is an oligopoly market 
where agents behave in accordance with the Cournot model, while there is perfect 
competition on the TGC market. In the second case both markets are oligopolistic, 
and Cournot behavior is assumed.  
 
In the first case we assume that the producers take the TGC price as given and maxi-
mize profits as a Cournot player on the electricity market. Clearly, the implication of 
this is that the producers will sell all TGCs generated. Hence, the objective function 
may be formulated as in the competitive case 
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A more compact way of characterizing the competitive solution may be obtained by 
successive substitution of the above conditions i.e. 
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This condition states that the producer's marginal revenue is equal to a linear combi-
nation of the individual producer's marginal cost of providing black and green elec-
tricity, with the percentage requirement as the combination weight. Moreover, by 
solving this equation the price of electricity, p, can be expressed as a function of y and 
z. In other words, by choosing the level of output of black and green electricity a gen-
erator can influence the market price of electricity. 
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We then turn to the second case and consider an electricity producer that behaves as a 
Cournot player in both markets. In the formulation to follow, however, we assume 
that the electricity producer does not game on the simultaneous functioning of the two 
markets
6. Rather we assume that the producer in determining the generation of green 
and black electricity only considers the electricity market and thus takes the TGC 
price as given.  
 
Likewise, we assume that the producer in determining the amount of TGCs to sell,   
only takes the TGC market into account and thus takes the wholesale price as given. 
This formulation may be considered as a standard Cournot formulation with multiple 
markets. It is however, necessary to take into account that the producer is constrained 
by the amount of TGCs generated, i.e. we must have 
i w
 
    i i z w ≤
 




i i i i i i i i i
z w . t . s
), z ( h ) y ( c sw ] z y [ q ) w , z , y ( Max
≤
− − + + = Π
 
 
To solve this problem, formulate the Lagrangian function 
 
] z w [ ) z ( h ) y ( c sw ] z y [ q ) w , z , y ( L i i i i i i i i i i i i − λ − − − + + =  
The first order conditions are 
 
0 ) y ( ' c q x
x













                                                 
6 For a discussion of this problem, see Amundsen and Nese (2004). For market power of intercon-
nected markets (e.g. emission permit markets and energy markets) see Montero (2009).   Furthermore, 
Traber and Kemfert (2009) analyze the impacts of the German Feed-in tariffs on both electricity prices, 
emissions and firms while taking account of market power and oligopolistic behaviour. 
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as q, by assumption, is considered as given by the agents as they sell TGCs.  
 
Eliminating * i λ  the equilibrium conditions may be expressed as
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Upon successive substitution of the above conditions, the following compact relation-
ship appears 
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This condition states that the producer's marginal revenue from the electricity and the 
TGC markets is equal to a linear combination of the individual producer's marginal 
                                                 
7 Observe that condition 15) assumes an interior solution for the TGC price. The reason for this is that 
the change of the TGC price following from a change in the sale of TGCs is equal to zero if the TGC 
price is at any price bounds. In such a case there would be no difference between optimality conditions 
of the present market setting and the market setting considered above (i.e. market power in the electric-
ity market only).  
  8cost of providing black and green electricity, with the percentage requirement as the 
combination weight. By solving the equation above the price of electricity can be ex-
pressed as a function of y, z and w. In other words, a generator affects the price of 
electricity not only by his output decisions, but also by selling or not selling the TGCs 
he has received. 
 
3. A two- country model 
Next we consider two countries, and A B , (such as Norway and Sweden) that trade 
both electricity and green certificates with each other. In this setting policy measures 
taken in one country may effect the decisions made in the other country.  
 
Under autarky each country will have to satisfy the same general set of equilibrium 
conditions as discussed above. Prices and quantities will, however, be specific to each 
country as determined by the demand function, the cost functions and the policy 
measure applied (percentage requirement).  
 
Opening for trade in electricity while still keeping separate TGC markets, the electric-
ity wholesale price will become the same in both countries. Thus it holds that 
. Considering the most general case of Cournot behavior in both mar-
kets the following conditions apply: 
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Observe that the common wholesale market implies that the derivatives of end-user 
prices will be the same for both countries even though end user prices may be differ-
ent. This follows from the fact that  
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and the assumption that the TGC price is considered as given when operating in the 
electricity market. 
 
Opening for trade in certificates, the TGC prices will be equated and become the same 
for both countries. Thus, it holds that  * * * s s s B A = =  at a level intermediate to the 
initial TGC prices of the two countries.  
 
In this setting there is a need for an additional variable and an additional equation 
(stating that total certificates applied must be equal to total certificates sold) to de-
scribe the equilibrium solution. Hence, we describe the number of certificates used in 
country  j  by  . Net import of certificates for country  j v j  is then equal to  . 
The set of equilibrium conditions now reads 
j j w v −
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A special case applies if only one of the two countries has a TGC system and genera-
tors in the other country are allowed to participate in that system. For instance, Nor-
wegian generators of green electricity could receive Swedish TGCs and be allowed to 
participate in the Swedish market for TGCs. 
 
4. A numerical model  
In order to shed some light on the real world situation a numerical model with the 
same basic structure as the analytical model has been used. The model is an updated 
  10version of the static model of the Nordic electricity market, i.e. the integrated electric-
ity market of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, initially used in Bergman and 
Radetzki (2003). 
 
The basic features and assumptions of the numerical model are as follow: 
 
•  In each country there are 3-5 major electricity generation firms, acting as 
Cournot players, and a number of small generation firms forming a competi-
tive fringe. There is no entry of new firms, but the incumbent firms may invest 
in new capacity. 
•  Marginal cost curves are step-wise increasing and linear, reflecting unit costs 
and capacity limits for various technologies.
8 
•  Green electricity encompasses electricity generated by wind, water and bio-
mass. However, only electricity generation in new small hydropower plants 
are considered green, whereas electricity generation in existing hydropower 
plants are considered black
9 just as electricity generated in nuclear-, gas-, 
coal-, and oil power plants.   
                                                
•  Free-trade in electricity between the four Nordic countries, but inter-connector 
capacity limits may lead to different wholesale prices in the various countries 
•  Two alternative trade regimes for the TGC market: Autarky or free trade be-
tween the four Nordic countries 
•  Two alternative assumptions about the behavior of the major firms in the TGC 
market: Price taking (perfect competition) or Cournot behavior. The fringe 
firms always behave as price takers both in the electricity and the TGC mar-
ket.  
•  Constant elastic demand curves in each country (price elasticity: -0,3)  
 
Using 2001 as its base year the model projects annual equilibrium prices and quanti-
ties in, and cross border tariffs between, the electricity markets in Denmark, Finland, 
 
8 The cost of production in an electricity generation unit is equal to the variable cost in existing units 
and the sum of the variable cost and the annualized capital cost in a new unit. 
9 For  Norway black electricity generation is almost exclusively taking place in water power plants 
whereas  black electricity generation in Sweden also includes electricity from nuclear-, gas- and  coal 
power plants.  
  11Norway and Sweden. It also projects equilibrium prices and trade in the markets for 
TGCs in Norway and Sweden. 
 
In the model it is assumed that the rights to exploit the most favorable sites for wind 
power production has been acquired by the major power generators. Thus a “fringe” 
power producer who wants to enter the market for green electricity only has access to 
more costly wind power sites, i.e. sites where wind conditions and/or the cost of con-
necting to the grid is higher than for the sites available for the major generators. 
 
In the following we will use the numerical model to analyze to what extent a require-
ment to have a certain percentage of green electricity in Sweden affects the Nordic 
electricity market. We consider both autarky and free trade of TGCs. Moreover we 
analyze to what extent that market power in the TGC market affects the electricity 
market. The case of no TGC market is considered as a benchmark. The focus is on the 
year 2010. As the effects of the Swedish TGC system are similar in the three other 
Nordic countries we only present the results for Norway (being a significantly larger 
national electricity market than Denmark and Finland together). 
 
5. Simulation results 
Using the numerical model we have considered three alternative cases, or projections, 
for 2010, and compared the outcome for prices and quantities with the corresponding 
data for the benchmark case (denoted Base 2010). Note that the Base case is also a 
projection, and that “electricity consumption” includes transmission and distribution 
losses. In the tables prices are expressed in € per MWh. The different cases are de-
fined in the following way: 
 
Base 2010 
In this case there is free trade in electricity between the Nordic countries, i.e. Den-
mark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. There is no TGC system in Sweden or in any 





  12Case 1 
Again free trade in electricity between the Nordic countries is assumed, but now a 
TGC system with the percentage requirement equal to 12.7
10 is introduced in Sweden. 
Perfect competition in the Swedish TGC market is assumed, but there is no cross-
border trade in TGCs. 
 
Case 2 
This case is like Case 1, except that the major generators act as Cournot players in the 
market for TGCs 
 
Case 3 
This case is like Case 2, except that generators in Denmark, Finland and Norway are 
allowed to participate in the Swedish TGC system, and to trade TGCs across the Nor-
dic borders. 
 
We present the simulation results by pair-wise comparisons of the four alternatives. In 
order to analyze the impact of a TGC system on the electricity market we compare 
Base 2010 and Case 1. Note that in Case 1 the Swedish TGC market is assumed to be 
perfectly competitive, i.e. no generator can, or decides to, exercise market power on 
the TGC market. Also note that producer prices are equal to producer prices in Nor-
way. The key results are summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. Base 2010 vs. Case 1 
  Base 2010 Case 1 
 












                                                 
10 The official percentage requirement for 2010 is 17.9 percent. However, as electricity intensive indus-
tries are exempt from the requirement to use a certain fraction of “green” electricity the average per-
centage requirement on all electricity consumption is 12.7. 
  13Producer price of electricity in Norway, €/MWh 26.6 24.4 
 








As can be seen in the table the introduction of a TGC system leads to a reduction of 
the producer prices of electricity, i.e. the system and area prices determined at the 
common Nordic power exchange Nord Pool. The reason for this is that the TGC sys-
tem induces additional investments in generation capacity. As a result the supply of 
electricity increases, and the equilibrium producer price falls. 
 
The consumer price of electricity in Sweden, however, increases as a result of the per-
centage requirement and the positive price of TGCs. Thus electricity consumption in-
creases in Norway (where producer and consumer prices are the same in the model) 
and decreases in Sweden. 
 
The price of TGCs in Case 1 is somewhat lower than the actual TGC prices observed 
2008-2009, which varied within the range 30-35 €/MWh. For the period 2004-2006, 
when the percentage requirement was lower, the prices projected by the model were 
very close to the observed prices. The somewhat higher prices in 2008 and 2009 could 
be a result of market power being exercised, but it could also reflect relevant costs not 
fully taken into account by the model. 
 
Next we analyze the potential impact of market power on the Swedish market for 
TGCs, i.e. we compare Case 1 and Case 2. The results are summarized in Table 2. As 
can be seen in the table there is considerable potential market power on the TGC mar-
ket. If this market power is fully exercised the equilibrium prices of TGCs would be 
several times higher than the prices hitherto observed.  
 
Moreover, the impact on the electricity market would be significant, reducing electric-
ity consumption in Sweden by around 15 percent. The numbers may seem unrealistic, 
but they clearly indicate that the percentage requirement, which is the core feature of 
  14a TGC system, opens up a new possibility to exercise market power in the electricity 
market.  
 
Table 2. Case 1 vs. Case 2 
  Case 1 Case 2
 




































One reason for the significant potential market power created by the TGC system is 
that the TGC market is a quite small national market with a small number of relatively 
large players. Consequently it is an oligopolistic market in which each player has sig-
nificant market power. One way of dealing with that problem is to enlarge the market 
and open up for international trade in TGCs. Case 3, where generators in the other 
Nordic countries are allowed to participate in the Swedish TGC market, represents 
one possibility along these lines. 
 
Case 3 implies that, from a Swedish policy perspective, green electricity generated in 
Denmark, Finland and Norway is seen as a perfect substitute for green electricity gen-
erated in Sweden. Consequently TGCs are allocated to generators in the other Nordic 
countries on the basis of the same principles as TGCs are allocated to Swedish gen-
erators. Moreover, all generators in the Nordic countries can sell their TGCs in the 
Swedish market for TGCs. Needless to say the Case 3 “model” has not been seriously 
considered by policy makers in the Nordic countries. However, it illustrates a serious 
  15drawback of the current Swedish TGC market. The simulation results are summarized 
in Table 3, where the results for Case 1 also are included. 
 
Table 3. Case 2 vs. Case 3 
  Case 2 Case 3 Case 1 
 

















































As can be seen in the table the addition of new participants on the Swedish TGC mar-
ket increases competition and significantly reduces the possibilities to exercise market 
power. In fact, opening up for cross-border trade with TGCs (Case 3) essentially has 
the same effect on the electricity market as perfect competition in a national Swedish 
market for TGCs (Case 1). 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In connection with the restructuring of the electricity markets in the Nordic countries 
market power was seen as a major potential problem. The reason was that each one of 
the national (in Denmark two disconnected regional markets) was dominated by one 
major power company. However, by integrating the national markets this problem 
was significantly mitigated. Our results indicate that market power is a potential prob-
lem in the Swedish market for TGCs, but again the solution seems to be market inte-
gration. That is, to open up the Swedish market for green power producers in the other 
  16Nordic countries. The argument for doing this becomes even stronger if a TGC sys-
tem is introduced in the other Nordic countries. 
 
In concluding this paper it should be noted that the success of introducing TGC mar-
kets not only depends on the ability to mitigate market power but also on other fac-
tors. One potential problem is the volatility, both short term and on an annual basis, of 
TGC prices resulting from natural variations in wind conditions (see Amundsen, 
Baldursson and Mortensen (2006)). In Denmark, for instance, the supply of wind 
power may vary by 25 percent (compared with the annual average) between windy 
and calm years.  
 
As the marginal cost of wind power generation is close to zero for existing capacities 
competitive wind power generators will at all times produce what is feasible and thus 
generate erratic and price inelastic supply. Hence, the number of TGCs issued and 
available for sale will also be highly volatile and this will lead to a considerable un-
certainty with respect to the remuneration (i.e. the sum of the TGC price and the 
wholesale price) of investment in green technologies. This in its turn may also influ-
ence the required rate of return for investors in renewable electricity i.e. the required 
rate of return would be higher as compared with what would be necessary if subsidies 
were stable and certain.  
 
However, an integration of the Swedish TGC market with other Nordic TGC markets 
would be a solution, or at least a remedy, to this problem. This is because wind varia-
tions in various parts of the Nordic area probably are not closely correlated. Hence, an 
extension of the TGC market would stabilize TGC prices.  
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